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SEXUAL HARASSMENT: LIMITING THE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE IN THE DIGITAL WORKPLACEt
Donald P. Harris*
Daniel B. Garrie**
MatthewJ. Armstrong'
Digital communications sexual harassment is on the rise. Such harassment occurs
through sexually offensive and unwarranted e-mails, placing harassing messages
on electronic bulletin boards, and other forms of harassment that occur through the
Internet. To date, courts have remained silent on the issue of sexual harassment by
digital communications. Should this type of harassment be treated any differently
than harassment that occurs in the physical space? The somewhat surprising an-
swer is yes.
This Article advocates applying a new judicial framework for addressing digital
communications sexual harassment. This new framework accounts for the real-world
technology in the digital workplace and the legal framework that courts have con-
structed in connection with affirmative defenses to harassment. An employer's ability
to monitor and block digital communications and thus prevent sexual harassment is
the fundamental dfference between digital and physical sexual harassment and the
underlying reason for treating them differently and for modf ying the affirmative de-
fense. The Article proposes that when an employer fails to utilize available technology
to prevent sexual harassment, the affirmative defense should be either modified or al-
together unavailable. Adopting this approach, courts would appropriately place an
affirmative obligation on employers with blocking and monitoring technology to take
reasonable preventative measures to prevent digital workplace harassment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment law has greatly evolved over the last few dec-
ades. Specifically, harassment claims have expanded to include
employer liability for co-worker harassment, supervisor harassment,
and, most recently, third party harassment.' Correspondingly, courts
have provided employers with specific defenses against such liability.2
For example, an employer escapes liability if the employer takes
preventative and corrective measures reasonably calculated to end
the harassment Such absolution is justified because in many in-
stances, the employer is unable to prevent the harassment from
occurring but is able to take subsequent measures to ensure that
4the harassment does not continue or recur.
This judicial treatment, however, provides little comfort to a
harassment victim. The ideal solution would be to prevent harass-
ment from occurring in the first instance. The Supreme Court
agrees; it has held that employers should take preventive measures
to ensure a harassment-free workplace consistent with Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its policy of encouraging the crea-
tion of antiharassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms.5 While providing this type of environment is not al-
ways possible in the physical workplace-hence providing the need
for the corrective measures affirmative defense-it is possible in
the digital workplace, where communication occurs more regularly
through e-mail, the Internet, instant messaging, and other digital
means.
Increasingly, sexual harassment conduct includes actions
through these digital communications." Unlike with physical har-
1. See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (D. Nev. 1992) (hold-
ing that an employer may be liable for sexual harassment of employees by non-employees).
See generally Karen Kaplowitz & Donald P. Harris, Third Party Sexual Harassment: Duties and
Liabilities of Employers, A.B.A. BRIEF, Spring 1997, at 32, 33-35.
2. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
3. See Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 1, at 36.
4. Id. at 38.
5. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
6. See Garrity v.John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8343 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (holding that an employee terminated for sending har-
assing e-mails had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his work e-mail); McLaren v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *1 (Tex. App. May 28,
1999) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-owned e-
mail system); see also Mitchell Waldman, Annotation, Expectation of Privacy in Internet Commu-
nication, 92 A.L.R.5TH 15, § 3(c) (2001); Daniel B. Garrie & Matthew J. Armstrong,
Comment, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act'sEffect on ElectronicDiscovery, FED. LAw., May 2005, at 4,51.
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assment claims, employers have access to technology capable of
preventing digital communication harassment claims.' In particu-
lar, companies can deploy existing information technology ("IT")
with which they can monitor and block offending digital commu-
nications. Equipped with this technology, employers are able to,
and often already do, monitor employee communications! Em-
ployers do so for various reasons, including protecting trade
secrets,0 monitoring productivity," and enforcing corporate in-
formation technology use policies." In light of these uses, and
more importantly, the legal sanction of these uses, employers
should monitor their networks for offensive e-mails or communica-
tions that constitute harassment, thereby securing a harassment-
free workplace. Employer liability thus should turn on whether the
employer took reasonable precautions in view of the available
technology. The outcome of that assessment should have a direct
bearing on the employer's ability to claim an affirmative defense to
employee allegations of digital workplace harassment.
This Article addresses sexual harassment in the modern digital
arena. Specifically, it offers a new framework for courts to analyze
digital sexual harassment claims. Part II of this Article briefly re-
views the legal remedies for sexual harassment and the employer's
affirmative defense, including the underlying rationale for the de-
fense. Part III provides a critique of the defense when it is applied
to the digital workplace environment. The failure of the employer
to capitalize upon and utilize the available technology to prevent
sexual harassment is cause to modify or make unavailable the af-
firmative defense. Finally, Part IV offers a new test-the Digital
Workplace Defense Test-that courts should invoke when review-
ing an affirmative.
In essence, the modified test and framework provide that courts
should permit the affirmative defense in the digital workplace only
under limited circumstances. Accordingly, courts first should ex-
amine the defendant employer's technology infrastructure to
determine whether the defendant's existing information technol-
ogy was capable of monitoring and blocking the digital
7. See David N. Greenfield & Richard A. Davis, Lost in Cyberspace: The Web @ Work, 5
CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 347 (2002).
8. Id.
9. See discussion infra Part III.A.
10. See Frank C. Morris, Jr., Workplace Privacy Issues: Avoiding Liability, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 697, 715 (ALL
ABA Course of Study, June 3-5, 1999), available atWL SD52 ALI-ABA 697.
11. Id. at 713.
12. Id. at 725-26.
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communications comprising the harassment claim. If the employer
does not possess the requisite technological capabilities, the em-
ployer should be permitted to plead the affirmative defense. If,
however, the court finds that the defendant possessed such capa-
bilities, the court then should explore whether or not the
defendant took reasonable steps to monitor and block the offensive
digital communications or whether the defendant can articulate a
rational reason for not utilizing readily available technology to
prevent workplace digital harassment.' 3 A critical factor here is
whether the employer utilizes such technology for other non-
harassment related uses. If the court concludes that the defendant
did not take reasonable steps, the court should not allow the defen-
dant to plead the affirmative defense.14 Adopting this approach,
courts would appropriately place an affirmative obligation on em-
ployers who possess blocking and monitoring technology to take
reasonable preventive measures to prevent digital workplace har-
assment.
15
II. HOSTILE WoRK ENVIRONMENT
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Claims about gender discrimination derive from Title VII 16 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964."7 Congress enacted Title VII to protect
employees from discrimination based on gender, race, or religion
in the workplace. 8 Title VII establishes two different theories of
liability based on gender discrimination and sexual harassment:
(1) Hostile work environment; and (2) Quid pro quo, or discrimi-
natory acts having tangible employment consequences.19
13. See discussion infra Part WA.
14. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971); Snyder v. Guardian Auto.
Prods., Inc., 288 E Supp. 2d 868, 874 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding in part that a harassed
female employee failed to establish that she was subjected to a hostile work environment on
the basis of her gender because anonymous computer messages telling her to "stop acting
like you're actually working" did not reflect gender-based motive or bias).
15. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238; Snyder, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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A. Review of Legal Remedies
Courts first recognized the hostile work environment cause of
action in race-discrimination cases beginning in the early 1980s. 20 A
hostile work environment is created when conduct by a supervisor,
co-worker, or third party occurs that is sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter the conditions of an individual's employment and
create an abusive working environment.2 In Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, the United States Supreme Court, recognizing that sexual
harassment constitutes a form of gender discrimination and is
therefore prohibited by Title VII, extended the hostile work envi-
ronment cause of action to include sex discrimination.23 The Court
recognized that the standard for imputing liability to an employer
for creating a hostile work environment differs depending on
whether the alleged harasser is a supervisor, co-worker, or third
party.2 4 When harassment is alleged based on conduct by a co-
worker or third party, the employer is liable only if the plaintiff can
prove that (1) the employer knew of or should have known of the
harassment, and (2) the employer failed to take prompt and effec-
tive remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment-
in essence a negligence standard.2' As to supervisor harassment,
the Court declined "to issue a definitive rule on employer liabil-
ity"26 when supervisors create hostile work environments.27 Rather,the Court simply stated that it "agree[d] with the EEOC that
20. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986); Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236-
41.
21. See generaUy Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 1, at 33.
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
23. See id. at 73; see also Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding
supervisors' behavior created a hostile environment).
24. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793-801 (1998); Meritor, 477 U.S. 57;
see also Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 1, at 33-34.
25. Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 380-81 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (citing Katz
v. Dole, 709 E2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)) (holding that employer's response to complaint
of sexual harassment fell short of prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the
harassment where employer spoke to one alleged harasser and placed a warning letter in
the file of another alleged harasser, but failed to inspect or discipline numerous other har-
assing employees); Kaplowitz & Harris, supra note 1, at 36.
26. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St.
Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169, 176
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)), 454 F.2d at 238). The
Court articulated that a hostile work environment was actionable in sex discrimination cases
because "the EEOC issued Guidelines specifying that 'sexual harassment,' as there defined,
is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII." Id. at 65.
27. Id. at 72.
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Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance
in this area."
28
The lack of a definitive rule on this point initiated twelve years
of controversy and disagreement in the lower circuit courts. These
courts sought to establish a standard for employer liability based on
the Supreme Court's broad recommendation to apply agency prin-
ciples. To summarize the various circuit court approaches, courts
have held employers vicariously liable for supervisor misconduct
under three different theories: (1) the supervisor was "aided by"
within the scope of his or her employment; (2) the supervisor was
"aided by" the agency relationship in committing the harassment;
or (3) the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the
harassment and failed to remedy it.29 In addition to agency princi-
ples, courts also have held employers liable on negligence grounds
for failing to prevent harassment. °
In order to resolve the disagreement among the circuit courts,
the Supreme Court established a new standard for employer liabil-
ity in two groundbreaking decisions, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton"t
and its companion case, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.32 In
these cases, the Court set forth two different standards for em-
ployer liability. First, the Court held that if supervisor harassment is
not accompanied by an adverse official act or "tangible employ-
28. Id. With regard to quid pro quo harassment, which by definition is committed by a
supervisor or someone with power to effectuate tangible employment actions, employers are
strictly liable for supervisor harassment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
29. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793.
30. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 E2d 1504, 1516 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
employer liable where hotel manager did not respond to complaints about supervisors'
harassment); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding employer
liable for harassment by co-workers because supervisor knew of the harassment but did
nothing); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding employer liability be-
cause the "employer's supervisory personnel manifested unmistakable acquiescence in or
approval of the harassment"); see also Torres v. Pisano, 116 E3d 625, 634-35, 634 n.11 (2d
Cir. 1997) (citing Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 61, 64 (2nd Cir.
1992); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986)) (noting that a
supervisor may hold a sufficiently high position "in the management hierarchy of the com-
pany for his actions to be imputed automatically to the employer"); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d
503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Under traditional agency principles, the exercise of such actual or
apparent authority gives rise to liability on the part of the employer under a theory of re-
spondeat superior." (citation omitted)); Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 62 ("The supervisor is deemed
to act on behalf of the employer when making decisions that affect the economic status of
the employee. From the perspective of the employee, the supervisor and the employer
merge into a single entity."); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 E2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[A]
supervisory employee who fires a subordinate is doing the kind of thing that he is author-
ized to do, and the wrongful intent with which he does it does not carry his behavior so far
beyond the orbit of his responsibilities as to excuse the employer.").
31. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
32. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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ment action," such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reas-
signment, the employer still may be held liable. In such situations,
the employer may raise an affirmative defense to such liability. The
affirmative defense must consist of two necessary elements: "(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.
Next, the Court held that if the supervisor harassment is accom-
panied by an adverse official act then the employer is strictly
liable.' Most notably, the Court held that the affirmative defense is
not available to an employer when a "tangible employment action"
occurs.3 5 When a tangible adverse employment action accompanies
the harassment, strict liability is appropriate-and the affirmative
defense is appropriately unavailable-for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding: (1) that a supervisor's decision "merges" with the
employer, and his act becomes that of the employer; (2) the super-
visor acts within the scope his or her authority when he or she
hires, fires, or demotes the employee; and (3) the supervisor is
aided by the agency relation in discriminating against the em-
ployee.
B. Rationale Behind the Supreme Court's Creation
of the Affirmative Defense
The Supreme Court reasoned that creating the employer's af-
firmative defense provides an incentive for employers to take both
preventive and remedial measures to limit occurrences of sexual
harassment in the workplace.36 Examples of such measures include
instituting a grievance procedure, educating employees and super-
visors about sexual harassment, and ensuring that employees are
notified of their rights regarding harassment.
In holding that employers can be held vicariously liable for su-
pervisors' conduct, the Court recognized that employers are in a
33. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Elierth, 524 U.S. at 765.
34. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Elerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
35. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790-91.
36. See Petrosino v. Bell Ad., 385 F3d 210, 226 (2d Cir. 2004); Pfeiffer v. Lewis County,
308 E Supp. 2d 88, 106 (N.D.N.Y. 2004); Sutton v. Zemex Corp., 261 . Supp. 2d 392, 395
(W.D.N.Y. 2003); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 E Supp. 2d 773, 777 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
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position to prevent sexual harassment-a clear goal of Title VII.
31
However, the Court also recognized that employers are not the
only actors that can minimize harassment. Thus, while the first
prong of the affirmative defense imposes an affirmative obligation
on employers to prevent the harassment from occurring, the second
prong imposes an obligation on employees to take actions to mini-
mize any harm caused to them.
C. The Affirmative Defense Setting Today
While the Court's holding is not an explicit mandate for em-
ployers to adopt internal anti-harassment policies and procedures,
the Court's pronouncement provides a noteworthy incentive by
granting employers possible immunity if they do implement such
policies and procedures.38 In explaining why employer liability
might appropriately be applied for supervisor misconduct under
certain circumstances, the Court noted that the different treatment
between supervisors on the one hand, and co-workers and third
parties on the other, is justified because a supervisor "[n] ecessarily
draw[s] upon his superior position" in harassing the victim, and
the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against supervisor
misconduct.39 The Court refused, however, to impose "automatic
liability" for supervisor harassment, stating that under certain con-
ditions it may be inappropriate, for instance when the employer
exercised due care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it
occurred. 40
In 2004, in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders," the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed the affirmative defense in the context
37. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798, 806 ("[Title VII's] 'primary objective' ... is not to pro-
vide redress but to avoid harm." (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417
(1975))).
38. See, e.g., Slay v. Glickman, 137 F. Supp. 2d 743, 752 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (granting em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that because the employer had a sexual
harassment policy of which the plaintiff was aware and promptly investigated plaintiffs alle-
gations of harassment, plaintiff did not establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard
to whether the defendant employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct sexual harassment in the workplace); Hairston-Lash v. RJ.E. Telecom, Inc., 161 E
Supp. 2d 390, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (granting summary judgment for the defendant em-
ployer, stating that plaintiff did not contest that she had received notice of employer's
extensive policies and procedures on handling sexual harassment).
39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
40. Id. at 805.
41. 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
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of a constructive discharge claim. In Suders, a female police dis-
patcher for the Pennsylvania State Police filed a claim against her
employer alleging both sexual harassment and gender discrimina-
tion.42 Suders claimed constructive discharge by alleging that
relentless sexual harassment by her supervisors left her no option
but to resign from her position.43 Reversing the trial court's deci-
sion, the Third Circuit held that Suder's constructive discharge
constituted an adverse employment action, and therefore, under
the Faragher and Ellerth framework, the employer was strictly liable
and was not permitted to assert the affirmative defense.44
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while some construc-
tive discharge cases amount to official employer action, not all
constructive discharges result from a supervisor's official act. Ac-
cordingly, the Court concluded that the employer is prohibited
from relying on the affirmative defense only when a supervisor's
official act precipitates a constructive discharge. Where, however,
there is no official act underlying the constructive discharge, the
employer is entitled to assert the affirmative defense.45 Suders thus
reinforces the role of the affirmative defense in the physical work-
place; it does not, however, answer the question of whether the
affirmative defense should be permitted in the digital workplace.46
III. CRITIQUE OF THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN
THE DIGITAL WORKPLACE
Digital workplace harassment arises when employees use e-mail
or the Internet to sexually harass other employees or to create hos-
tile work environments. 47 Very few cases have addressed employer
liability for such acts. In Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the court
held that a single incident of inappropriate e-mail was not suffi-
cient to establish a claim even though unchecked offensive e-mail
communications circulating within the workplace could constitute
42. Id. at 133.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 139.
45. Id. at 148.
46. See id.
47. See Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 551-52 (N.J. 2000);Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Liability of Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R.5th
169, § 4(b) (2000).
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harassment.48 In Strauss v. Microsoft Corp.,49 the court held that jokes
and sexual parodies, in addition to other remarks, e-mailed by a
supervisor to employees were admissible and relevant evidence of
sexual harassment.
In Blakey v. Continental, Inc.,5° the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that a harassed female employee had a valid harassment
claim where the allegedly defamatory and sexually harassing mate-
rial was posted on an electronic bulletin board. Although the
employees could access the bulletin board only through the Inter-
net, and the employer, Continental, did not maintain the bulletin
board, the court found that Continental had a duty to remedy the
harassment and correct off-site harassment by co-workers.5 ' The
court found that the employer bulletin board forum was suffi-
ciently integrated into the workplace and Continental had notice
of the harassment. Blakey stresses thatan employer's responsibility
to prevent sexual harassment and hostile work environments may
extend to both the physical and digital workplaces. 2 Under Blakey,
employers are obligated to take affirmative steps to halt employee-
to-employee digital harassment once the employer has knowledge
of harassment."
The court stopped short of placing an affirmative obligation on
employers to prevent sexual harassment by having employers
monitor digital communications. The Blakey court stated that while
"employers do not have a duty to monitor private communications
of their employees," employers "do have a duty to take effective
measures to stop co-employee harassment when the employer
knows or has reason to know" of such harassment.54 Blakey limited
its reach due to "grave privacy concerns.""5 However, recent deci-
48. Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 CIV. 9747, 1997 WL 403454, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 17, 1997).
49. Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 91 CIV. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1,
1995).
50. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 543. In Blakey, a female pilot claimed that she suffered from a
hostile work environment by being the subject of a series of harassing and defamatory mes-
sages posted on an Internet bulletin board accessible to all Continental pilots and crew
members. Id. at 544.
51. Id. at 543, 551-52, 558.
52. Id. at 551.
53. Id. at 551-52.
54. Id. at 552; see also Herman v. Coastal Corp., 791 A.2d 238, 251-52 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (finding no employer liability absent showing that harassing employee op-
erated within scope of employment and that employer acted negligently or intentionally
and/or failed to take effective remedial measures).
55. Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551.
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sions and legislative enactments have reduced privacy concerns
and suggest extending Blakey.
A. Monitoring Technology in the Workplace
Courts have recognized an employer's right to monitor employ-
ees' e-mail messages and use digital technologies to protect trade
secrets.16 In addition, courts have consistently found that employ-
ees do not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
when employers have e-mail policies that notify employees that the
employer may monitor their e-mail or Internet use.57 Employers
have the right to invade employees' digital work spaces because
employers have legitimate interests in all communications trans-
mitted on their digital networks.58 For instance, an employer has
the right to observe employees' transmitted digital communica-
tions to ensure work productivity, 9 to prevent trade secret
disclosure, 60 to prevent transmission of defamatory statements, and
to prevent transmission of unauthorized or illegal material over the
employer's digital communication network.6'
In monitoring employees, the vast majority of large employers
use digital tracking technology.62 According to a recent Washington
Internet Daily release, eighty percent of major U.S. companies at
least sometimes record and review employees' electronic commu-
nication or browser use.63 Sixty-seven percent of employers have
disciplined at least one employee for improper or excessive use of
e-mail or Internet access; thirty-one percent have fired employees
56. Id.; see also Eric P. Robinson, Big Brother or Modern Management: E-mail Monitoring in
the Private Workplace, 17 LAB. LAw. 311,325-26 (2001).
57. See Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 E3d 393, 409 (2d Cir. 2004); Konop v. Ha-
waiian Airlines, Inc., 302 E3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002); Nexans Wires SA. v. Sark-USA, Inc.,
319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2711 (2000).
58. See Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
abuse of access using workplace computers is so common that "reserving a right of inspec-
tion is so far from being unreasonable that the failure to do so might well be thought
irresponsible").
59. Morris, supra note 10, at 702.
60. Id.
61. See Amy Rogers, You Got Mail but Your Employer Does Too: Electronic Communication and
Privacy in the 21st Century Workplace, 5J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 9-30 (2000).
62. Lawyer; Employers Fighting Net Abuse Must Mind Privacy, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Apr.
24, 2002, available at http://www.wrf.com/ (search "employers fighting net abuse"; then
follow article hyperlink under "In the News").
63. Id.
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for such conduct. 64 It is estimated that more than three-quarters of
major U.S. corporations record and review employee communica-
tions and activities on the job, including but not limited to,
telephone calls, e-mail, Internet communications, and computer
files.65 E-mail monitoring by employers is a necessity as well as a
legally recognized right.66 Courts have granted employers this right
to enable them to prevent personal use or abuse of company re-
sources, investigate corporate espionage and theft, resolve
technical problems, and better cooperate with law-enforcement
officials in investigations.
Many companies utilize software to monitor and/or block their
681
employee's use of the corporate technology infrastructure.
SilentRunner is illustrative of such software. 69 While most lawyers
and employees have never heard of SilentRunner,70 many companies
and governmental agencies use the program to monitor their agents
64. Id.
65. AM. MGMT. ASS'N, 2001 AMA SURVEY: WORKPLACE MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE:
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 1 (2001), available at http://www.amanet.org/research/
pdfs/ems short200l.pdf.
66. See generaly Jennifer J. Griffin, The Monitoring of Electronic Mail in the Private Sector
Workplace: An Electronic Assault on Employee Privacy Rights, 4 SOFTWARE LJ. 493 (1991).
67. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002); Greenfield
& Davis, supra note 7, at 348.
68. See generally Richard Hull et al., Enabling Context-Aware and Privacy-Conscious User
Data Sharing, IEEE INT'L CONF. ON MOBILE DATA MGMT., Jan. 19-22, 2004, at 187; R. H.
Irving et al., Computerized Performance Monitoring Systems: Use and Abuse, 29 COMM. ACM 794
(1986); Pete Lindstrom, Diverse Security Technologies Deliver the Same Message: Keep Out!
Guide to Intrusion Prevention, INFO. SECURITY, Oct. 2002, available at http://
www.infosecuritymag.com/2002/oct/sidebar.shtml; M. Tamuz, The Impact of Computer Surveil-
lance on Air Safety Reporting, 22 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 69 (1987).
69. SilentRunner is capable of recognizing over 1400 different protocols. Jay Lyman,
SilentRunner Spyware Out-Snoops FBI's Carnivore, NEWSFACTOR, Mar. 2, 2001, available at
http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?storyid=7873. It can collect any traffic on the net-
work at a rate of 195,000 plus packets per second. Jeffrey Benner, Nailing the Company Spies,
WIRED NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001, http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,41968,00.html
(quoting Dave Capuano, Vice President of Product Management for TruSecure); see alsoJ.
Rule & P. Brandy, Surveillance in the Workplace: A New Meaning to 'Personal' Computing, PRoc.
INT'L CONF. ON SHAPING ORG., SHAPING TECH., 1991, at 183.
70. See Jeffrey Benner, Privacy at Work? Be Serious, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001,
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,42029,00.html; see also Benner, supra note 69
("In 1999, Raytheon took action against some of its own employees it suspected of compro-
mising company information. Some of them learned the hard way that talking about one's
employer 'privately,' and even anonymously, can be risky. In February of that year, Raytheon
sued twenty-one 'John Does' for $25,000 in damages due to criticisms of the company made
on Internet message boards. Raytheon said it suspected current and former employees of
being responsible for the anonymous postings, accusing them of revealing confidential in-
formation. The company successfully subpoenaed Yahoo to find out who made the
comments, then abruptly dropped the suit. At least four of the twenty-one, including one
Vice President, resigned after being identified.").
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and employees.7' According to TruSecure spokeswoman Susan Lee,
SilentRunner provides constant employee monitoring for nearly
four hundred companies.72 Organizations using SilentRunner and
similar software, such as Deloitte & Touche,73  have adopted
top-secret attitudes74 towards their employees regarding their use of
the product.7  Maintaining secrecy about employee monitoring
software enables companies to avoid scrutiny from groups con-
cerned about the erosion of privacy in the workplace.76 While the
efforts of some companies to maintain secrecy about their moni-
toring software may imply that such monitoring is indeed immoral,
dishonest, or unethical, whether it is in fact such turns on the em-
ployee's reasonable expectations. In situations where the
employer's policies make it clear to employees that such monitor-
ing takes place, the employee has no or very little expectation of
privacy. Where no such policy is made clear to employees, the
question is more open to debate.77
In addition to employer's ability to monitor employee digital
transmissions, employers often possess a high degree of control
over employee computer desktops. This control is meant to help
employee productivity by ensuring that a uniform technical envi-
ronment exists. For example, ActivatorDesk's Enterprise Desktops
Controller monitors employee computing activities and compares
those activities to a list of approved activities. 78 If an employee per-
forms non-previously approved activities, "ActivatorDesk can
71. Benner, supra note 69; see also Kristie Lu Stout, China Police Unleash Net
Filterware, CNN, Mar. 1, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/28/
hk.policefilter/index.html.
72. Benner, supra note 69.
73. Id. ("'SilentRunner is completely undetectable to end users, and it captures every-
thing,' said Kris Haworth, manager of the Deloitte & Touche computer forensics lab in San
Francisco."). See generally Detmar W. Straub & William D. Nance, Discovering and Disciplining
Computer Abuse in Organizations: A Field Study, 14 MIS Q. 45 (1990).
74. See A. Gumbel, Techno Detectives Net Cyber-Stalkers, INDEP. ON SUNDAY, Jan. 31, 1999,
at 17.
75. Benner, supra note 69 ("Until December 2000, when security services provider
TruSecure revealed it had purchased the 'lite' version of the program, not one organization,
public or private, had admitted to buying SilentRunner. On Feb. 1, the computer forensic
division of consulting firm Deloitte & Touche became the second to say it uses the pro-
gram.").
76. See generally MaryJ. Culnan, Protecting Privacy Online: Is Self-Regulation Working, 19J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 20, 20-26 (2000). While the authors strongly believe that privacy
concerns should trump employer concerns, the point of this section is to demonstrate that
courts have permitted employers to use such monitoring and tracking devices despite em-
ployee privacy concerns. Whether this is appropriate is not the subject of this Article.
77. Id.
78. Michelle Delio, New Tools a Spying Boss Will Love, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 13, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,56324,00.html.
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instantly implement a 'lock-down policy"' while sending network
administrators an e-mail alerting them of the violation. 9 Another
example is WinWhatWhere's Investigator, which offers "Stealth
WebCam Monitoring," to snap images with computer cameras
enabling the employer to tie computer usage to specific employ-
ees." WinWhatWhere's Investigator also offers key-phrase alerts,
which monitors computers for specific phrases and instantly noti-
fies system administrators if a restricted phrase is spotted."'
In sum, the majority of large corporate employers in the United
States currently use digital monitoring and blocking software. With
this software these employers have the ability to observe and block
inappropriate digital communications over corporate IT networks
before the intended recipient receives them. Currently, employers
have utilized this power without also being required to protect
their employees. As a result, employees are relinquishing privacy
rights without receiving any benefit of employer protection in re-
turn. Due to the judicially recognized diminished expectation of
privacy in the workplace, employees are only entitled to bring suit
when an intrusion infringes upon intensely private matters or
when the employer has failed to inform them of the monitoring. 
2
In Leventhal v. Knapek,3 the Second circuit illustrated this princi-
ple. Here, the court held that an employee does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his digital activi-
ties in the workplace. 4 In support of the same principle, Congress
enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA),85 and the Stored Communications Act (SCA),86 granting
employers the right to monitor employees' e-mail messages. The
ECPA and SCA permit an employer to monitor e-mail communica-
tions, as long as the monitoring occurs in the ordinary course of
business. The majority of case law interpreting the ECPA has found
79. Id.; see also Wallace Immen, Workplace Privacy Gets Day in Court GLOBE & MAIL, Apr.
28, 2004, at C1.
80. See Delio, supra note 78.
81. Id.
82. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 E Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (D. Ariz.
1998); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 E Supp. 1310, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding em-
ployer may have intruded on an employee's privacy by reading personal medical documents
on employee's desk).
83. 266 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2001).
84. Id. at 74.
85. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
86. Stored Communications Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Star. 1848, 1860-68
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000)).
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that employers can monitor employee e-mail messages with or
without consent, even without notice.
The combined actions of Congress and the courts have effec-
tively expanded employer abilities to monitor employee electronic
communications without violating federal privacy laws. Because
employers now have access to, and control over, employee elec-
tronic communications, they have the ability to greatly minimize
instances of digital sexual harassment in the workplace. 9 For ex-
ample, employers can block e-mails containing sexually explicit
terms and restrict wallpaper settings on corporate computers so
that users cannot display inappropriate or offensive material. The
ability and the right to monitor all employee digital transmissions
places employers in an ideal position to take simple proactive pre-
ventive measures that may prevent the majority of instances of
digital sexual harassment in the workplace.
The Ellerth and Faragher decisions and the Blakey line of cases
should be extended as a result of employers' rights and abilities to
read digital communications sent and received by employees. Em-
ployers using blocking and monitoring technology have effective
notice of potential workplace sexual harassment before the in-
tended recipient receives it.90 As a result, the employers should
bear the burden of providing reasonably sufficient technical pro-
tection to limit exposure to digital workplace sexual harassment.
Unfortunately, however, courts have not yet bridged the gap be-
tween employer freedom to monitor employee acts and employer
responsibility to monitor employee acts. More precisely, courts have
yet to address whether an employer should be entitled to plead an
affirmative defense for digital sexual harassment when the employer
fails to monitor the digital work environment, prevent digital sexual
87. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004); Fraser v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d
1130, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the professor, who had entered a conditional
plea for downloading child pornography to his workplace computer, had no expectation of
privacy in his use of his public employer's computer, especially since the university's usage
and monitoring policy was displayed upon login); United States v. Bunnell, No. CRIM.02-13-
B-S, 2002 WL 981457, at *2 (D. Me. May 10, 2002) ("A [public university] student has no
generic expectation of privacy for shared usage on the university's computers.").
88. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
90. See generally United States v. Simons, 206 E3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Butler, 151 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D. Me. 2001) (finding student had no objective ex-
pectation of privacy in using university computers even absent evidence of a university policy
giving notice of right or intent to monitor use).
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harassment, or institute mechanisms to facilitate employee com-
plaints pertaining to digital sexual harassment.9'
B. The Current Framework of the Affirmative Defense Undermines
both Congressional and Judicial Policies
In Ellerth2 and Faragher,93 the Supreme Court sought to compel
employers to take a proactive role in preventing workplace sexual
harassment. Today, an employer pleading the affirmative defense is
able to avoid being held accountable for hostile digital work envi-
ronments created by the transmission of sexually harassing
material over corporate IT networks. By not requiring preventive
policies, courts deny employees the benefit of receiving assistance
before sexual harassment occurs. This is particularly inappropriate
when the employers have effective notice of sexually harassing
communications through the use of monitoring software.94 This
result violates the U.S. Supreme Court's intent, as stated in Ellerth
and Faragher and discussed in Blakey, to compel employers to take a
proactive role in preventing workplace sexual harassment.95 In ad-
dition, the docket of both the state and federal courts is likely to
grow until issues arising from digital harassment are effectively ad-
dressed. Courts, therefore, should modify the Faragher and Ellerth
affirmative defense to protect employees in the digital workplace
by creating a more efficient and effective legal framework to han-
dle digital sexual harassment claims. Of course, this does not
preclude legislative action. The courtroom does, however provide
an obvious arena for this change, evidenced by the Court's keen-
ness to address these issues in cases such as Meritor and Ellerth.
The current framework of the affirmative defense focuses on the
employer's corrective measures and the employees' actions in avail-
91. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
92. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
93. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
94. The EEOC has declared that twelve Minneapolis librarians were subjected to a
sexually hostile work environment when they were exposed to pornography accessed on the
Internet by library patrons. See, e.g., EEOC Rules in Minneapolis PL Complaint, AM. LLBR.
ONLINE, May 28, 2001, http://www.ala.org/ala/alonline/currentnews/newsarchive/
2001/may2001 (follow "EEOC Rules in Minneapolis PL Complaint" hyperlink). If courts
agree with the EEOC, all libraries, public and private, will need to ban Internet access to
"offensive" sites or face hostile environment liability. See, e.g., Five More Minneapolis Librarians
File Discrimination Charges, Am. LIBR. ONLINE, May 29, 2000, http://www.ala.org/ala/
alonline/currentnews/newsarchive/2000/may2000/fivemoreminneapolis.htm.
95. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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ing themselves of the corrective opportunities provided by the em-
ployer. As applied in the digital workplace, the affirmative defense
is flawed in that it does not account for today's technology. Unlike
the physical workplace, employers in the digital workplace have the
ability to "know everything." In addition, employers in the digital
realm can control digital communications to prevent sexual har-
assment. Such differences call for the Court to modify the
affirmative defense in the digital workplace. 96
C. The Affirmative Defense in the Digital Workplace
The affirmative defense in the digital workplace should require
companies to institute more than mere remedial policies in situa-
tions where the employer already utilizes a wide and complex array
of e-snooping technology to monitor their employee transmis-
sions.97 Because many employers have the ability to prevent digital
sexual harassment accomplished through the use of e-mail, Inter-
net, and desktop monitoring software, employers should be
required to take such preventative measures.9
The affirmative defense should be modified in two respects.
First, the defense should focus on the employer's preventative meas-
ures, rather than corrective measures9 Second, the defense should
reduce (or eliminate) the employee's obligation to take advantage
of preventative opportunities, as employees will often not be aware
96. While the affirmative defense is available to employer's in the context of vicarious
liability for supervisor misconduct in hostile work environment sexual harassment claims (or
claims in which no tangible employment action results), the presence of employer monitor-
ing and blocking technology also is relevant in co-worker and third party sexual harassment.
First, from the perspective of harassing conduct committed using digital technology, the
employer can guard against the misbehavior of subordinate or common employee class just
as easily as it can against supervisor class. It would thus appear inappropriate to uphold the
two-tiered liability for these classes. Second, as noted above, in the context of co-worker or
third party harassment, the employer is liable if it knew or should have known of the har-
assment and failed to take effective remedial action. Arguably, armed with the technological
capability to do so, an employer will not be able to satisfy the first prong of this test, as it
either knew or should have known of the conduct.
97. See discussion supra Part IIIA.
98. See generally Joan E. Feldman & Larry G. Johnson, Lost? No. Found? Yes. Those Com-
puter Tapes and E-mails Are Evidence, GPSoLo, Mar. 2000, at 8; Matthew Fordahl, Screening of
Instant Messaging on Rise, CHI. TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 2002, at 6.
99. This is not to suggest that corrective measures will no longer be relevant. In some
circumstances, the employer may have the ability to monitor digital communications with-
out the ability to also block such communications. In these instances, the employer's
prompt and effective action to address the conduct may demonstrate that it exercised due
care.
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of or have access to the monitoring and blocking software in order
to take advantage of it.l°°
IV. A PROPOSED TEST ADDRESSING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
A HOSTILE DIGITAL WORKPLACE
The courts should permit the affirmative defense in the digital
workplace in a limited set of circumstances. The circumstances
should be determined by applying the Digital Workplace Defense
Test (DWDT).
DIAGRAM I
DWDT ANALYSIS
N TehooyI"lce
Defendant Can Plead
Affirmative Defense
__ FAIL REASONABLE TECH
TEHNLO<YDeny 
Affirmative Defense
ASSESSMENT
Yes Technology In Place
Reasonable Tech Test PASS REASONABLE TECH
Presumptive Burden On D Allow Affirmative Detense
To determine an employer's ability to invoke the affirmative de-
fense, the court must first examine the defendant's technology
infrastructure to determine whether the defendant's existing in-
100. Again, employee actions may nevertheless be relevant. If the employee fails to act
with reasonable care in taking advantage of other employer safeguards to either prevent
harassment that could have been avoided or notify the employer of harassment, the em-
ployer's liability may be affected. In other words, while the employee will not have access to,
and often be unaware of, the employer's monitoring and blocking software, the employee
still should be required to exercise due care in situations not involving an adverse or tangi-
ble employment action.
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formation technology could have monitored and blocked the digi-
tal communications responsible for the sexual harassment claim. If
the court ascertains that the defendant lacked the ability to moni-
tor and block digital communications,"°' the court should allow the
defendant to plead the affirmative defense.'
If, however, the court finds that the employer possessed moni-
toring and blocking capabilities, it then must examine whether or
not the defendant took reasonable steps to monitor and block
these digital communications. At this step, the defendant has the
burden of proving that it employed reasonable efforts to block
sexually harassing digital communications based on the capabilities
and normal use of its information technology systems. If the de-
fendant is unable to overcome this burden, the court should reject
the defendant's affirmative defense. If, on the other hand, the de-
fendant meets this burden by establishing that its use of blocking
and monitoring technological systems was reasonable, the court
should allow the defendant to plead the affirmative defense.
Under this analytical framework, the availability of the affirma-
tive defense is contingent on the presence and use of technological
systems that are capable of monitoring and blocking the responsi-
ble digital communication. By placing the burden on the
defendant, the court properly holds employers responsible for the
alleged hostile work environments that they control. This simply
reflects the reality that, unlike in the physical workplace, in the
digital workplace, preventive measures can eliminate harassment
when the employer has blocking and monitoring technology.
101. Companies usually block all communications that they know fall outside the
bounds of acceptable communications in the workplace and monitor employee communica-
tions. See David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy: The Workplace Issue of the '90s, 23 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 591, 597-615 (1990) (discussing the history of suits brought by employees
for invasion of privacy); Gary T. Marx, The Case of the Omniscient Organization, HARV. Bus.
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 12 (describing use of new electronic devices to monitor employees
outside of traditional "workplace," including monitoring in one's home and car). At times a
company may elect to monitor and then block employee communications depending on the
specifics of the company information technology policies. See Julia Turner Baumhart, The
Employer's Right to Read Employee E-Mail Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 LAB. LAw. 923,
936 (1992); see also James J. Ciapciak & Lynne Matuszak, Employer Rights in Monitoring Em-
ployee E-Mail, FoR DEF., Nov. 1998, at 17, 17-20.
102. The genesis for this Article came from Mr. Game's extensive work implementing
information technology systems, as he questioned the concept of privacy in light of an em-
ployer's unbridled access to all digital communications that employees transmitted via
company system components.
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A. Review of an Employer's Technology Set
In performing the first step of the analysis, a court should exam-
ine whether the defendant's technological infrastructure had the
capability of blocking and monitoring the digital communications
alleged in plaintiff's action.0 3 In examining this, the court should
explore various aspects of a defendant's technological environ-
ment, including technological infrastructure and policies. °4 When
applicable, a court should address the following six issues.
First, a court should ask whether the defendant protects its valu-
able digital information such as financial data, customer records or
sensitive intellectual property.'05 In such situations, the court
should be mindful that a defendant employer who protects its digi-
tal information would likely be monitoring its Web applications
because early detection enables the defendant to prevent serious
economic damage./°6 For example, an employer in the media in-
dustry will protect its media by implementing both physical and
digital technologies to ensure that employees do not make unau-
thorized copies of the media for pre-release. In this situation, the
employer will likely be protecting the digital medium with some
form of encryption and an access monitoring tool that will help
prevent such a scenario from arising.
Second, the court should look to whether the defendant utilizes
some form of real-time suspicious activity and policy violation de-
tection technologies.' Instant messaging systems in some financial
institutions offer an example of an employer utilizing real-time
tracking technology.0 8 Such employers implement messaging sys-
tems that have real-time logging capabilities, which, for example,
103. See Lynda M. Applegate et al., Information Technology and Tomorrow's Manager, HARV.
Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 128.
104. See Karen Nussbaum, Workers Under Surveillance, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 6, 1992, at
21, 21.
105. See generally Carl Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A Model for
Predicting Panoptic Effects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293 (1996).
106. See generally Philip Brey, Worker Autonomy and the Drama of Digital Networks in Organi-
zations, 22J. Bus. ETHICS 15 (1999); BRITISH TELECOM, VISION & VALUES: BETTER WORLD-
OUR COMMITMENT TO SOCIETY (2001), available at http://www.btplc.com/
Societyandenvironment/PDF/2001/isionvalues.pdf.
107. See generally Bill Bruck, How COMPANIES COLLABORATE SHARING WORK ONLINE
(2001), available at http://consortium.caucus.com/pdf/collaboration.pdf; COLLABORATIVE
STRATEGIES, ELECTRONIC COLLABORATION ON THE INTERNET AND INTRANETS: How MAJOR
CORPORATIONS ARE LEVERAGING IP NETWORKS FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (2001).
108. See Roger Harris, IM: When Time Matters, HISPANIC Bus., Nov. 2002, at 34, 34, available at
http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/news/newsbyid.asp?id=7679&cat-Magazine&more-/magazine.
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enable them to comply with the message storage requirements that
are established under Sarbanes-Oxley.' 9 These systems provide the
employer with the ability to track instant message conversations in
real-time. When employers deploy such technology, the courts
should examine whether the employer's inaction with respect to
the digital workplace is reasonable respective to the monitoring
technology being used."' When such technology is being utilized
the court should further explore the process and design of the sys-
tem focusing on whether the defendant both monitors and blocks
communications.
Third, the court should examine whether the defendant utilizes
some form of user tracking. The "research trail" that is provided by
Westlaw"' (a Web enabled legal research system) provides an ex-
ample of this sort of tracking technology. This technology enables
the employer to record the employee's actions with respect to a
particular Web-based tool set. Again, when an employer utilizes
such tracking devices, the court should ascertain whether the em-
ployer could have reasonably modified this monitoring and
tracking technology to protect the digital workplace.
Fourth, the court should determine whether the defendant is
monitoring its systems using real-time technology for suspicious
user behavior." 3 The monitoring technology that is triggered when
a user's password is frozen is an example of such technology. When
a user mistypes his or her password three times, the system may flag
the account or send an alert, in real-time, to a monitoring party.
This type of monitoring technology is common in the financial sec-
tor to assist banks in preventing fraud or abuse of financial
accounts.'4
Fifth, the court should review all of the defendant's recording
systems. " 5 Such technology is relied upon heavily by financial and
109. See Doug Henschen et al., Brave New World: Three Trends Redefining Content Manage-
ment, TRANSFORM MAG., Apr. 2004, at 16, 16-18, 20-22, 24.
110. See W. Michael Hoffman et al., You've Got Mail ... and the Boss Knows: A Survey by the
Center for Business Ethics of Companies' Email and Internet Monitoring, 108 Bus. & Soc'y REv.
285, 302 (2003).
111. SeeWestlaw, http://www.westlaw.com.
112. See generally Joey F. George, Computer Based Monitoring: Common Perceptions and Em-
pirical Results, 20 MIS Q. 459 (2001); Terri L. Griffith, Monitoring and Performance: A
Comparison of Computer and Supervisor Monitoring, 23J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 549 (1993).
113. See Martin Butler, Staff Left in the Dark over Monitoring Technologies, COMPUTER
WKLY ., May 4 2004, at 24.
114. See generally E. L. Lesser & J. Storck, Communities of Practice and Organizational Per-
formance, 40 IBM Sys.J. 831 (2001).
115. See generally Simson L. Garfinkel, Privacy Matters, CIO MAG.,June 1, 2000, at 178; II-
Horn Hann et al., Online Information Privacy: Measuring the Cost-Benefit Trade-Off INT'L CONF.
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medical organizations. In these fields, having access to such data to
enable computer forensic experts to construct an audit trail and
deliver sufficient evidence of transactions is very important. 16 Such
technology is also commonly deployed in hospitals where the pa-
tient's records must be protected; the hospital is often required to
track and demonstrate that the digital records are released only to
authorized parties.
Sixth, the court should determine whether the defendant util-
izes a form of early end-user-management monitoring
technology.17 Such technology monitors end-users from the end
users' location. For instance, global companies with worldwide cus-
tomers use tools that enable them to monitor the location from
where their customers communicate."" Employers frequently use
this technology when its employees are working off-site to ensure
that its employees are performing the work as promised and the
client is receiving authorized services.1 9
Because companies utilize a unique blend of these elements, in
addition to other forms of technology, these six points are in-
tended only as guidelines for the courts. 20 Regardless of the
specific technology and its uses, these guidelines help the court
focus on the degree of tracking, monitoring, and blocking tech-
nology that is utilized by the company.
When performing this analysis, courts should ensure that they
are applying a reasonableness standard in evaluating the defen-
dant's technological blocking and monitoring capabilities. 2' While
"reasonableness" is a malleable concept, courts are nonetheless
often required to use such a standard. 22 This standard should be
mindful of the associated costs, efforts, and the defendants' knowl-
ON INFO. Sys., Dec. 2002, at 1-2, available at http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/-ipng/
research/privacyjicis.pdf.
116. See Hoffman et al., supra note 110, at 290-92.
117. See Jay Mellman, Where I, Business Meet, COMM. NEWS, Aug. 2005, at 38, 39-40,
available at http://www.comnews.com/stories/articles/0805/0805whereIT.htn.
118. See Dawn S. Onley, Technology Gives Big Brother Capability: New Technology Allows Com-
panies to Monitor Employees' Whereabouts to Improve Productivity, HR MAG., July 2005, at 99, 99-
101.
119. SeeMellman, supra note 117, at 39-40.
120. See generally Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 E3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000); Leysia Palen & Paul
Dourish, Unpacking "Privacy"for a Networked World in CHI LErTERS, CONFERENCE ON HUMAN
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, Apr. 5-10, 2003, at 129, available at http://
www.cs.colorado.edu/-palen/Papers/palen-dourish.pdf.
121. See generally Paul Attewell, Big Brother and the Sweatshop: Computer Surveillance in the
Automated Office, Soc. THEORY, Spring 1987.
122. The reasonable person standard is commonplace in tort, criminal law, and com-
mercial law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-504 (1998) (make contract for transportation of goods "as
may be reasonable").
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edge of their respective monitoring capabilities in their digital
workplace. 123 More precisely, a court should make a fact-specific
inquiry, on a case-by-case basis, considering such factors as the size
of the company, the number of employees, the ease and economy
with which the system can be utilized/modified to monitor and
prevent harassment, the employer's knowledge of acts of harass-
ment, and the volume of the digital transmissions the employer
must track, as well as other factors.2 4 Finally, courts should use
heightened awareness when reviewing defendants utilizing tech-
nology that complies with either the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, HIPAA,
125
or other legislatively mandated tracking or monitoring require-
ments." 6 In such cases, it is almost certain that monitoring and
tracking technology is in place.
127
When the court finds that the necessary technological infra-
structure is not in-place, it should permit the defendant to plead
the affirmative defense as it currently operates. Here, the focus is
appropriately on corrective measures and other types of preventa-
tive measures such as education and notice. The only exception
would be when the plaintiff's claim alleges and presents clear and
overwhelming evidence that the defendant decided not to utilize
blocking and monitoring technology to preserve the ability to use
the affirmative defense for digital workplace harassment. For in-
stance, if a plaintiff produces e-mails establishing that the
defendant's decision was driven by their desire to avoid losing the
right to plead the affirmative defense, the courts should deny the
defendant the right to assert the affirmative defense notwithstand-
ing the technological systems in place. This exception is necessary
because courts should sanction defendants who deliberately ex-
pose their employees to a hostile digital workplace. Upon finding
that the defendant's technological infrastructure was capable of
both blocking and monitoring the alleged digital communications,
123. See supra note 115.
124. In essence, the analysis resembles a cost/benefit analysis that examines the reason-
ableness of preventing harassment in the context of a particular employer's technological
capabilities and current use of such technology. For example, if an employer currently uses
e-mail monitoring technology and would not incur additional cost to monitor e-mails for
inappropriate and offensive communications, it would be reasonable to impose liability or
limit the employer's ability to use an affirmative defense.
125. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C.).
126. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No 106-102, 113 Stat. 1339 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
127. See Jeremy Blackowicz, Note, E-Mail Disclosure to Third Parties in the Private Sector
Workplace, 7 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 80, 89 (2001).
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the court must then examine whether the defendant took reason-
able steps to block or monitor the alleged digital communications.""
B. Determination of Whether the Employer Took Reasonable Efforts
to Prevent the Receipt and/or Transmission
of the Digital Communications
In the second step of this analytical framework, the court should
utilize information previously gathered to assess the defendant's
technological systems to determine whether the company took
reasonable measures to block and monitor other digital communi-
cations unrelated to the sexually harassing communications. The
court may find it useful to appoint an independent third-party,
similar to the expert utilized in digital discovery disputes, to ascer-
tain whether the defendant utilized its technology in a reasonable
manner to protect the digital workplace.
As mentioned above, in assessing the reasonableness of an em-
ployer's conduct, the court must perform a fact-specific analysis on
a case-by-case basis. A court should consider both fiscal costs and
corporate policies when ascertaining whether the implementation
of such technological systems would have been pragmatic.
V. CONCLUSION
Workplace sexual harassment and hostile work environments
violate an individual's constitutional right not to suffer discrimina-
tion in the workplace. The Supreme Court, therefore, acted in
both a socially responsible and ethical manner when recognizing
hostile work environment harassment. Because employers are not
clairvoyant and cannot control the actions of all of their employ-
ees, business associates, or customers, and cannot force them to
utilize their preventive procedures, the Court adopted equitable
principles in permitting employers to assert an affirmative defense.
Today, courts have yet to fully appreciate or take into account an
employer's ability to take reasonable preventive digital measures in
protecting the digital workplace. This not only provides a disincen-
tive for employers to utilize digital measures, but also is
128. See supra p. 90 and Diagram I: DWDT Analysis.
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inconsistent with the congressional mandate to avoid harm rather
than provide redress. Given the expansive monitoring by employ-
ers of employee digital communications, it is reasonable for the
courts to require those same systems to monitor digital communi-
cations that are of a sexually harassing nature. The courts,
therefore, should modify the affirmative defense. This will not only
ensure protection of the digital and physical workplace for em-
ployees, but also create an efficient and effective legal framework
to address digital sexual harassment claims.

